Core principle: no new token
Most L2 networks launch a token to pay operators and fund governance. Sundial doesn’t. There is no issuance schedule, no emissions and no token allocation. Operators are paid from the fees that users pay, and security rests on bonds posted in an existing asset.Transaction fees
Every L2 transaction pays a fee. The minimum follows Cardano’s formula with the same constants:Why costs fall as usage grows
An L1 commitment costs the operator a fixed fee, however many L2 transactions the block holds. The more transactions in a block, the smaller the L1 cost each one carries. In the whitepaper’s benchmark runs, the L1 cost per L2 transaction fell from 944 lovelace with small blocks to 17 lovelace with full ones. See Performance.Operator bonds
To become an operator, you post a bond ofrequired_bond in ADA. The bond backs your promise to commit only valid blocks.
- The bond stays locked while you are active.
- After you retire, you recover it once every block you committed has matured.
- If a block you committed is proven fraudulent, you forfeit it.
Slashing
A forfeited bond is split in two:
The two always sum to the full bond.
Operators can also lose part of their bond for inactivity. An operator that repeatedly fails to commit blocks during its shifts, or ignores user events, is retired and pays
inactivity_slashing_penalty.
Watcher incentives
Anyone can check committed blocks and prove fraud. A watcher needs no bond and no registration. A successful proof pays the watcherfraud_prover_reward.
A watcher’s costs are the L1 fees for the proof’s transactions and the infrastructure to read and replay blocks. See Run a watcher.
Settlement fees
When an operator finishes processing the deposits, withdrawals and transaction orders of a merged block, it can claim that settlement as resolved. Once the claim matures unchallenged, the operator recovers the ADA held in the settlement UTXO and some fees for the work. A false claim is slashable like a fraudulent block.Why these amounts keep the rollup secure
The security argument needs three amounts to be set well:- The bond is large enough to deter fraud. A block proven invalid never enters the confirmed state, so fraud earns nothing to set against the lost bond.
- The reward is large enough to keep watchers looking. Checking blocks has to be worth doing even when fraud is rare.
- The reduced bond in an emergency still covers the reward. While the escape hatch is in force, new operators can register with a smaller bond. That bond must stay above
slashing_penalty, so a slashed operator still leaves a reward for the prover.